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LABOR LAw-LMRA-STRIKE WITHOUT COMPLIANCE WITH ARBITRATION
CLAUSE OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT AS UNPROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY-A

disput!;! arose over the working hours and assignment of one of the employer's truck drivers. The employer suggested to the union that they
refer the question to an arbitration panel for adjudication. The collective
bargaining agreement provided that the panel was to be the exclusive
means of settling all such matters, but the agreement did not contain a
specific no-strike clause.1 The union refused to arbitrate and ordered a
strike. Subsequently, the employer discharged twenty of the strikers and
then refused to reinstate them at the termination of the strike. The union
claimed that the strike was a protected concerted activity under section 7
of the amended National Labor Relations Act,2 and that the discharges
were violations of sections 8 (a) (I) and 8 (a) (3) of the act.3 The National
Labor Relations Board held that, by striking, the employees had breached
their collective bargaining agreement, and, therefore, had forfeited any protection the act might give to such concerted action. W. L Mead, Inc., 113
N.L.R.B. No. 109, 36 L.R.R.M. 1392 (1955).
It has been uniformly held in the past that economic strikes are unprotected concerted activities, where the collectiv~ bargaining agreement
contains a no-strike clause. 4 Absent such a provision, the employees may

1 Article VIII of the collective bargaining agreement read: "Should any dispute,
grievance or complaint arise during the life of this agreement which the Business Representative fails to adjust, the dispute, grievance or complaint shall be referred to the
Arbitration Panel, which Panel shall be the exclusive means of adjudicating all matters."
Principal case at 1393.
2 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 140, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §157.
3 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 140, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (a)(l),
(3).
4 NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., (7th Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 948,
affd. 306 U.S. 292, 59 S.Ct. 501 (1939); Scullin Steel Co., 65 NL.R.B. 1294 (1946); Joseph
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strike in furtherance of their disputes with the employer without subjecting themselves to discharge. 5 But there are exceptions to this rule, other
than the no-strike clause cases. An employer may discharge employees who
strike for an unlawful purpose,6 or for the promotion of interests other
than their own.7 The principal case has added yet another exception.
There is authority for the Board's ruling in NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co.,
where the Supreme Court said that "the Act does not prohibit an effective
discharge for repudiation by an employe of his agreement, any more than
it prohibits such discharge for a tort committed against the employer." 8
And in NLRB v. Dorsey Trailers, lnc.,9 it was held that an employer could
discipline employees who struck without resorting to an agreed upon
grievance procedure. The question arises, however, whether the Board is
equating arbitration clauses with no-strike clauses, or is limiting its decision in the principal case to those arbitration clauses which state that
arbitration is to be the exclusive means of settling disputes. If all arbitration clauses and grievance procedure provisions in collective agreements
are to have the same effect as no-strike clauses, the facts of life of traditional
collective bargaining will be overlooked. It is normally the union which
bargains for arbitration clauses, while the employer makes concessions for
the inclusion of a no-strike clause.10 To hold that a union has waived its
right to strike under such circumstances is contrary to the probable intent
of the parties. In the principal case the Board held that the unambiguous
language of the agreement precluded resort to parol evidence to show that
the union did not intend the arbitration clause to be a waiver of the right
to strike.11 However, both logic and the inferences of the Board would
seem to limit the right of the employer to discharge his striking employees
to situations where it is agreed that arbitration is to be the only method
Dyson&: Sons, Inc., 72 N.LR.B. 445 (1947); United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949);
Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1953); Kraft Foods Co., 108 N.L.R.B.
1164 (1954). See Daykin, "The No-Strike Clause," 11 UNIV. Pl'IT. L. REv. 13 (1949); 48
COL. L. REV. 1109 (1948); 63 YALE L. J. 1186 (1954).
NLRB v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., (9th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 748.
6American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944).
7 See Daykin, "The No-Strike Clause," 11 .UNIV. Pl'IT. L. REv. 13 at 15 (1949).
s 306 U.S. 332 at 344, 59 S.Ct. 508 (1939).
9 (5th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 589. In Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 63 N.L.R.B. 1340
(1945), the discharged employee had refused to follow the production schedule set by
management, but it is not clear whether the Board allowed the discharge because of his
insubordinate conduct or because of his failure to follow the regular grievance procedure.
See also Uni.ted Elastic Corp., note 4 supra.
10 See Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 478 (1948); 68 HARV. L. REv. 1472 (1955).
l l Is the language quoted in note 1 supra so unambiguous? Is it not a question of
whether the union intended the arbitration clause as a waiver of the right to strike or
whether it merely intended it to be the exclusive means of settling those disputes submitted for adjustment?
5
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of settling disputes.12 The Board does point out that the strike involved
in the principal case was not the result of an unfair labor practice by the
employer. Apparently, therefore, the doctrine of NLRB v. Mastro Plastics
Corp.,18 in which an unfair labor practice strike was held to be protected
by the act even though the collective bargaining agreement contained a
specific no-strike clause, would apply to cases where an arbitration clause
similar to the one in the principal case is involved. It may be noted that
the instant ruling does not exclusively benefit the employer. It would seem
only logical that clauses such as that involved in the principal case should
preclude both strikes and lockouts.

Hazen v. Hatch, S.Ed.

l2 See Dorsey Trailers, Inc., note IO supra. Though holding that an agreement as to
grievance procedures does not act as a waiver of the right to strike, that case indicated
that, if it was agreed that the procedure was to be the only method of settling disputes,
the agreement could act as a waiver.
13 (2d Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 462, affd. (U.S. 1956) 76 S.Ct. 349. See Wagner Iron
Works, 104 N.L.R.B. 445 (1953); 53 CoL. L. REv. 1023 (1953).

